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1Technology and Technical Change in the MIT EPPA Model*
Henry D. Jacoby, John M. Reilly, James R. McFarland and Sergey Paltsev
Abstract
Potential technology change has a strong influence on projections of greenhouse gas emissions and
costs of control, and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are a common device for studying
these phenomena. Using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model as an
example, two ways of representing technology in these models are discussed: the sector-level
description of production possibilities founded on social accounting matrices and elasticity estimates,
and sub-models of specific supply or end-use devices based on engineering-process data. A distinction
is made between exogenous and endogenous technical change, and it is shown how, because of model
structure and the origin of key parameters, such models naturally include shifts in production process
that reflect some degree of endogenous technical change. As a result, the introduction of explicit
endogenous relations should be approached with caution, to avoid double counting.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Technical change is among the most important and least well-understood influences on
greenhouse gas emissions and the costs of their control. Yet we cannot come close to predicting
the specific details and costs of the alternative technology options that will be available in the
distant future. Instead, in order to avoid ignoring altogether the possibility that new options will
be developed, the modeling community has frequently resorted to including a “carbon-free
backstop technology,” assumed to be available at some future time at an imagined cost and at
large scale. Though often necessary, this approach is unsatisfying because it leaves open a
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2number of troubling questions: Does the technology rely on a resource available in limited
quantity or variable quality? Does it create other environmental problems? Can it be used equally
as a transportation fuel, in residential heating, or to generate electricity? What is the likelihood of
the option being available as assumed: One chance in two? One in 20?
Dissatisfaction with the generic backstop thus leads to calls for greater detail in describing
new technologies and their evolution over time. But concern then properly expands to include
the full range of alternatives, for what matters in the end is their cost and characteristics relative
to each other. For example, one may look forward to technological improvement in a low
emitting technology and foresee a time when it will be less costly than fossil alternatives. But
such an assessment should not ignore the potential for technological change in the production
and use of fossil fuels. They are a moving target. Other possible errors in the specification of
future alternatives include imagining a “competitive” energy supply but failing to consider
supporting technologies needed to utilize it, or celebrating a clean end-use technology while
failing to credit its energy carrier with emissions upstream. Given these difficulties in predicting
scientific and technical advance and the market viability of potential future options, the modeling
community is well advised to set modest goals for this aspect of climate policy studies, and
maintain a focus on uncertainty in studies of future developments.
Here we explore these issues in the context of a particular application: the MIT Emissions
Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. This model has been designed to serve several
functions in climate change studies, and to one degree or another the behavior of its modeled
technologies is relevant to all. First, the EPPA model is a component of the MIT Integrated
Global System Model (Prinn et al., 1999). In this role it is used to simulate emissions over a
century horizon in the absence of climate policy. In these studies (e.g., Webster et al., 2002,
2003) technology and technical change influence emissions growth and thus affect the magnitude
of human influence on the climate system.
The model also serves as a facility for analyzing the national costs of proposed emissions
control policies, both for the near term of a decade or so but also for studies of the stabilization
of atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the long term. Here the influence of current
technology and technical change depends on the application. The representation of current
technology is naturally very important for analysis of specific control measures in the short run,
like Kyoto Protocol-type emissions restrictions. Technology change, on the other hand, plays a
small role in these short-run analyses because of the long lag times for development and
implementation. Also, assessment of the desired level of policy stringency today may be only
slightly affected by assumptions about technological availability in 2020, 2050, or beyond
(Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Webster, 2002). The insensitivity of current effort to forecast future
technology results from the fact that we can adjust in the future as knowledge improves. For
example, a GHG pricing policy may spur innovation, and if so it is likely to be desirable to strive
for an even more ambitious target, because cost is lower than we thought. On the other hand,
3innovation may not respond to incentives, and then we may need to reconsider our earlier
weighing of the benefits and costs of an ambitious long-term target. In either case, these are
adjustments we can make year by year, as we see how technology actually responds. In contrast,
studies of the national or regional costs of long-term stabilization, based on fixed emissions
control paths over time, are sensitive both to the representation of current technology and to
assumptions about future technological change. Finally, the model also is used to study the
prospects for particular energy use devices or sources of energy supply, such as improvements in
automotive vehicle design (Schafer and Jacoby, 2004) or electric generation with carbon capture
and storage (McFarland et al., 2004). The technology description of the specific option is
naturally of crucial importance to the result.
In each of these applications of the model, therefore, it is important to keep track of the
particular question at hand and ways that current technology and future technical change may
influence it.
Like all models of complex systems, EPPA reflects a number of compromises—among details
of economic sectors and their technologies, levels of complexity in mathematical specification,
and computational feasibility. It is an evolving structure, capable of incorporating new insights
and empirical results regarding technical change as they are produced by studies dedicated to
specific technologies and factors influencing change. Here we describe the ways that technology
and technical change are represented in the current version of this model, highlighting areas of
application where ongoing research may make the greatest contribution to improvements in
policy assessment.
We begin in Section 2 with a brief review of the ways that technology and technology change
are represented economic models. The main focus is on computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models, of which EPPA is an instance. Two different types of technology representations are
found in these models: sector-level descriptions of production possibilities, and models of
specific supply or end-use devices. Section 3 introduces the economic production and emissions
components of the model at the sector level, along with a description of the way that capital
structure and vintaging intersect with the technology specification. Section 4 considers technical
change, still with a focus on sector-level production, and the exogenous and endogenous
mechanisms of change that are built into the EPPA model. Section 5 then turns to the handling of
particular supply sources, based on bottom-up engineering process descriptions. These options
produce substitutes for some of the energy products that are modeled at the sector level. The
way these options are modeled is described, along with two issues that arise when they are
implemented in aggregate models. First is quality of output. While the product of a new device
or design may be superficially similar to that of an existing one, there may be important
differences that make it an imperfect substitute. Second is the issue of market penetration, which
involves a complex interaction of adjustment costs and potential learning by doing. Models can
allow unrealistically rapid penetration of a new option if they fail to account for the costs of
4scaling up a new industry or quickly displacing existing capital stock. Also, the costs of modeled
alternatives that are not now economic may be mis-specified if the effects of experience and
associated R&D are ignored.
Finally, in Section 6 we draw together a list of the key challenges to understanding of
technology in climate policy, and opportunities for research to improve its representation in
CGE-type models.
2. TECHNOLOGY REPRESENTATION IN CGE MODELS
In most models applied to analysis of greenhouse gas emissions, “technology” is implemented
as an economic production function, specifying the quantities of various inputs that are required
to produce a unit of a particular output. Because different forms of analysis are applied to this
issue, however, different interpretations attach to this deceptively transparent concept.1 The
fundamental building block of technology description is the particular production process,
described in terms of fixed proportions of factor inputs (labor, capital, energy, materials, etc.)
required to produce a unit of a particular output—what is referred to as a Leontief technology.
Two examples are a gasoline-powered car and a gas-electric hybrid car producing the same
transportation services. In a Leontief sense these may be classified as different technologies, and
a shift from one to another described as a technology change. Many models of specific economic
sectors, like energy, are based on collections of functions of this form—an example being
engineering process models like MARKAL (e.g., Kypreos, 1996).
However, for analysis of the forces driving GHG emissions there is need to consider not only
energy supply and its emissions but also factors influencing demand, and the origins of a number
of other climate-relevant emissions. Moreover, such analysis needs to include a number of
countries or regions linked by international trade. Maintenance of a high level of technology
detail is not possible; some compromise is necessary and CGE-type models are one approach to
the task. Production activities of like characteristics are aggregated into sectors (e.g., agriculture,
transport, services, electric supply) with the production function—i.e., the technology—
represented at this aggregate level. Of course, at the sectoral level there are many ways (Leontief
processes) to produce the sector output, the precise mix of factor inputs being determined by
relative prices. A function used to describe these sector-level production possibilities can be
thought of as the envelope of processes at the more detailed level of specification. Thus
substitution among inputs at the aggregate level (perhaps driven by changes in relative prices)
may be within the definition of a single technology at the aggregate level but still be seen as a
shift in technology by observers thinking at a detailed engineering-process level. In the
discussion below, the term “technology” is used in the aggregate production function sense, with
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5the description “Leontief technology” applied when a fixed-coefficient engineering-process
concept is implied.
Next is the issue of what is meant by “new” technology, or technology “change.” In a CGE
model, a function describing “current” technology would allow only those factor combinations
that are feasible with current knowledge, under different combinations of relative prices. To
stretch the example above, personal transport might be provided by a gasoline car, a gas-electric
hybrid, or a horse and buggy—all alternatives available today at some set of relative input prices
and thus all contained within current technology. “New” technology, then, encompasses
production possibilities not now available at any reasonable set of relative input prices. Thus,
fossil, hydroelectric, nuclear and conventional wind power are all contained within current
technology, whereas fusion or a radically different wind power design represent new technology—
implying, as they do, a different aggregate production function for the electric sector. If an
aggregate production function is narrowly defined to represent only current possibilities, then,
technology change involves a modification of the function’s form—either allowing a decrease in
cost at constant factor prices, and/or opening-up wider substitution possibilities that could be
exploited with a change in input prices (Binswager, 1978). As will be seen below, the functions
actually implemented in CGE models may encompass a mix of current and new possibilities.
2.1 CGE Model Structure and Estimation
CGE models represent the circular flow of goods and service in an economy.2 Factor inputs
are supplied to the producing sectors, which in turn apply them to the provision of goods and
services to one another and to final consumers. Following the definitions above, the sub-models
of the production sectors thus attempt to represent the output possibilities available to an
economy—describing how factor inputs are transformed into the various intermediate goods, and
ultimately into products and services that satisfy the wants and needs of consumers. The circular
flow of products and resources is completed when the consumers supply needed inputs of labor,
capital, and resources (which they own, directly or indirectly) to the production process. This
same circular flow can be seen in the economy’s financial system. Consumers receive payments
for the factor services they supply, and they use this income to pay the producing sectors for the
goods and services they receive. The model computes the market-clearing prices of all produced
goods and services and of the input factors. Thus the prices of goods reflect the costs of the
factor inputs (wages, the return to capital, and payments to natural resources) and the cost of
intermediate inputs purchased from other producing sectors. The model steps forward in time (or
solves multiple periods simultaneously in a forward-looking formulation) driven by population
and productivity change, capital investment, resource depletion, and external policy influences.
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6Such a model starts from a base-year description of real and financial flows in the economy in
the form of a Social Accounting Matrix or SAM. A simplified version of a SAM is shown in
Figure 1. The production side of the economy is aggregated into a set of sectors, each of which
usually produces a single aggregated good or commodity. Looking along a row in Figure 1, the
amount of a good or commodity that is produced must be sufficient to serve the sum of demands
from other producing sectors plus the final demands of government, investment, consumer use,
and exports (minus imports). Viewing down a column, the amount of the good produced by an
industry is just exhausted in the payments to its inputs, plus taxes. Taking agriculture as an
example, these payments include the goods and services needed from other sectors (e.g.,
equipment, chemicals, energy) plus the payments for capital services, labor, resources (i.e., land)
and taxes.
The data in the input-output matrix, X in the figure, thus represents the technology in use in
the base or benchmark year, telling the amounts of various inputs that were then applied to
produce a unit of each sector’s output. It is, in effect, a Leontief-type representation at the sector
level, showing as it does one set of factor portions for each modeled output. As such it is a
“snapshot” of the economy as it was in the base year with its particular relative prices. Even with
current technology these factor proportions could change with changes in relative input prices,
tax rates, or a CO2 emissions penalty. To simulate the future, a set of sectoral production
functions is constructed for which the data in the SAM represent only a single static point. These
functions reflect the relative ease of substitution among the required inputs, which in turn will
determine how the production structure will change under variation in relative prices. The EPPA
model applies a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functional form for this purpose.
Figure 1. Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). [Adapted from Sue Wing (2001).]
7To take as an example good Y produced by inputs of labor (L) and capital (K), the CES relation is
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where the parameter ρLK is related to an elasticity, σ, commonly used to express the ease of
substitution between input factors:
σLK
LK
=
−
1
1 ρ
. (2)
The factor shares in such a formulation (aL and aK in Eq. 1) are computed from data in the SAM.3
In multi-sector models each sector will have inputs not only of capital and labor but also of
resources and intermediate goods, including the sector’s own product (e.g., steel used in
chemical manufacture, if both are included in an aggregated sector). Because the same degree of
substitution does not apply to all the input factors, the relation usually is specified by a nest of
CES functions (as will be seen below) with appropriate elasticity estimates, still with factor
shares derived from the SAM.
2.2 Technology Parameters in Aggregate Production Sectors
In a CGE model, then, these elasticity estimates (along with factor shares derived from the
SAM) are the parameters describing the technology for each sector. They are estimated based on
empirical studies of past economic performance, limits of physical laws and rules of economic
consistency, and expert judgment. Because the models are used to analyze issues with different
time horizons—as seen in the EPPA applications above—the estimates may reflect both the
understanding of substitution possibilities under current technology and judgments about how
these possibilities may change with scientific advance and technology R&D. As noted below,
this fact about parameter estimation creates an unavoidable difficulty in creating a clear
distinction within any CGE model result between substitution (current technology) and technical
change (new technology).
In addition to the possibility that new technology may to some degree be reflected in the σ
estimates, two exogenous forces leading to technical change commonly are included in CGE
models. First, it is well established that economic growth cannot be explained only by the growth
of labor and accumulation of capital. A residual productivity factor always remains. In part this
residual can be attributed to technical improvement, although it also may reflect other changes,
such as increased labor education and skills, better management practices, and improvements in
social capital (effective laws, stable political climate, supportive culture, etc.). This phenomenon
conventionally is represented in one of two ways—either as a change in total factor productivity,
or as an increase in labor productivity. For the rest of this discussion scant attention will be
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8devoted to assumptions about this key force of growth in the economy, but it is well to remember
that, as the main determinant of economic change, it influences all aspects of a future forecast,
including energy use and GHG emissions.
Second, it has not proved possible in previous studies to attribute all changes in energy
efficiency to specific processes or changes in other factor inputs. Indeed, many countries have
experienced reductions in the energy intensity of GDP even over long periods of the last century
when real energy prices were falling, and this is usually taken to indicate energy-saving technical
change. Unfortunately, a number of complexities arise in introducing this phenomenon in
economic models. To some degree the change may be a result of shifts in the sectoral
composition of output, so that the residual that can be attributed to technical change depends on
the sectoral aggregation of the particular model. Also, the change may result to some extent from
improved management and organization. Frequently, this phenomenon is reflected in CGE
models by an augmentation of the productive contribution of a unit of energy by means of
parameters reflecting Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement (AEEI), with an attempt to
make allowance for its complex origins.
2.3 Incorporating Non-Extant Energy Supply Sources
In many climate policy applications there is a desire to consider the fate of specific devices
or designs that may be currently available as options but are not reflected in the SAM, or that
simply merit specific assessment. In its SAM-based aggregation, for example, a CGE model
may have separate sectors for producing electric power from various fossil sources, hydro, and
nuclear. But none of these reflects the peculiar structure of a new sector that might produce
power from biomass. Thus, usually in the energy supply sectors, additional future options are
made available which produce a substitute for one of the aggregate sectors, and that use some
mix of the economy’s primary factors and intermediate goods and services. These alternatives
may be “new” in the sense defined above, but more generally they are options that could be
implemented with current knowledge—just not at current relative prices. Often the cost relations
for these non-extant technologies are based on bottom-up engineering cost data, so that CGE
models that include them are a hybrid.
3. PRODUCTION STRUCTURE OF THE MIT EPPA MODEL
The MIT EPPA Model is a recursive-dynamic multi-regional CGE of the type summarized
above. Version 4 of the model used here has been updated in a number of ways from Version 3
documented by Babiker et al. (2001). It includes non-CO2 GHGs, greater disaggregation of
technologies in the electric sector, and updated evaluation of economic growth and resource
availability (Hyman et al., 2003; McFarland et al., 2004; Reilly et al., 2003). Its SAM is built on
the GTAP data set, which accommodates a consistent representation of energy markets in
physical units as well as detailed accounts of regional production and bilateral trade flows
(Hertel, 1997). This new version of the model has been updated to GTAP5-E, with a base year of
91997. GTAP5-E includes the most recent input-output tables for the US and other countries, and
provides substantial flexibility in regional disaggregation. From 2000 onward, EPPA is solved
recursively at 5-year intervals.
The regional structure of the model is shown in Table 1. The Annex B Parties are aggregated
into seven nations or multi-nation groups. Under this aggregation Russia includes a number of
regions of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) that are not in Annex B. GTAP data are now available
to disaggregate Russia, which we plan to do in the near future. There are nine Non-Annex B
regions with China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico individually identified.
Table 1. Countries and Regions in the EPPA Model
Annex B Non-Annex B
USA China
Japan India
Europea Mexico
Canada Indonesia
Australia & New Zealand Persian Gulf
Russiab Africa
Eastern Europec Latin America
East Asiad
Rest of Worlde
a The European Union (EU-15) plus countries of the European Free Trade Area (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland).
b Russia and Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (which are included in Annex B) and Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (which are not).
The total carbon-equivalent emissions of these excluded regions were about 20% of those of the FSU in 1995.
At COP-7 Kazakhstan, which makes up 5 to 10% of the FSU total, joined Annex I and indicated its intention to
assume an Annex B target.
c Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
d South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.
e All countries not included elsewhere: Turkey, and mostly Asian countries.
3.1 Aggregate Production Sectors
Table 2 shows the production structure of the model.4 In an elaboration of EPPA Version 3,
the non-energy goods sectors now identify a services sector. Fossil energy supply sectors are
defined as shown, with resources credited to the appropriate regions. The oil sector includes
consideration of ongoing development of tar sands, which are only distinguishable by their
position on the cost curve from what are frequently called “conventional” sources. The greatest
detail is provided in electric power, with separate aggregate sectors for fossil, hydroelectric and
nuclear generation.
To illustrate the nesting of production functions applied in the model, Figure 2 shows the
structure applied to the Energy Intensive Industry (EINT) and Other Industries (OTHR) sectors.
The nesting for other sectors differs depending on their particular characteristics (for details see
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Table 2. Production Structure of the EPPA Model
Aggregated Production Sectors Non-Extant Supply Sources
Goods Shale Oil
Agriculture AGRI Unconventional Gas
Energy Intensive Industry EINT Wind & Solar
Other Industries OTHR Biomass
Services SERV Natural Gas-Combined Cycle (NGCC)
Transport TRAN NGCC with Capture and Sequestration
Energy IGCC with Capture and Sequestration
Crude Oil OIL
Refined Oil ROIL
Coal COAL
Natural Gas GAS
Electricity ELEC
Fossil (oil, gas and coal)
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Final Demand Sectors
Household Transport
Household Other
Government
Primary Factors
Labor
Capital
Land (agriculture and biomass)
Resources (oil, natural gas, coal, shale, nuclear, hydro)
Domestic Output
σ
AKL
   AGRI  EINT  OTHR  SERV  TRAN   Energy-Labor-Capital Bundle
σ
EVA
σ
DM
Energy Aggregate Value-Added
  Domestic Imports
σ
MM
σ
ENOE
σ
VA
  ELEC Non-Elec L K 
                  Regions 1 . . . n
σ
EN
COAL     OIL       GAS      ROIL
Figure 2. Production Structure of EINT and OTHR Sectors.
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Babiker et al., 2001). But all of the goods sectors share the features of substitution between
energy and value added of primary factors (with elasticity σEVA), a representation of capital-labor
substitution (elasticity σVA), and substitution between electric and non-electric energy (σENOE).
Easily seen in the nesting are the inputs of intermediate goods, including electric and other forms
of energy, and of the primary factors of labor and capital.
In addition to CO2, EPPA also estimates emissions of the other Kyoto gases (Hyman et al.,
2003). The model includes both a prediction of emissions over time, as a function of activity
levels in the aggregate sectors, and an endogenous analysis of the costs of reducing them. Also,
the model computes emissions of a number of other substances that are important for the
atmospheric chemistry of the greenhouse gases and production of aerosols (e.g., NOX, SOX, CO,
NMVOCs, NH3, black carbon).
Besides capital and labor the primary factors of production include land and fossil energy
resources (coal, conventional oil, natural gas, and shale). Each of the energy technologies
requires input of a specific resource factor, with its interpretation and parameterization
depending on the case. For the fossil fuels it is an input to the model of resource extraction,
which influences the pattern of exploitation over time. For hydroelectric power it represents the
water resource, which grows (or not) over time to represent the expansion of hydro capacity in
regions where that is possible. The nuclear resource factor is parameterized to the nuclear fuel
input share, and in principle could be related to a uranium resource depletion model as in fossil
resources. However, as currently used in the model, nuclear supply is fixed or can decline over
time to represent regulatory limits on expansion or possible phase-out.
3.2 Non-Extant Supply Options
Shale oil and coal gasification are represented as separate technologies, not currently used, but
able to produce a perfect substitute for oil and natural gas respectively if prices rise high enough.
Biomass generation and the natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) and integrated coal gasification
combined cycle (IGCC) technologies also produce electricity that is a perfect substitute for that
from the aggregate sectors. The NGCC technology (without capture) is needed to provide the
correct competitive environment for NGCC and IGCC technologies with capture and storage
included (see McFarland et al., 2004). To reflect their intermittent output (of which more below)
solar and wind sources are modeled as producing imperfect substitutes for the output from
aggregate electric sectors. They are represented by CES nestings (see Babiker et al., 2001) with
the factor proportions set to establish a technology-specific mark-up above the cost of the supply
alternative it the base year. As noted, these mark-ups are based on bottom-up analysis of the
individual technologies.
For the non-extant technologies the resource factor can be used to represent limited factors
that tend to drive up adjustment costs in the short run and influence the pace of introduction—
such as engineering or specialized manufacturing, environmental and other regulatory barriers.
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3.3 Capital Structure and Vintaging
An important EPPA feature, influencing technology behavior in the aggregate sectors, is its
modeling of capital structure and its evolution over time (Babiker et al., 2001). Each regional
economy is modeled as having two forms of capital in any period. One is “malleable” in that its
mix of inputs can be altered to be consistent with then current input prices. This portion includes
all new investment in each period, plus a portion of the (un-depreciated) capital inherited from
previous periods. The other component, constituting the remainder of the inherited old capital is
“rigid” in that inputs are fixed at the proportions set in the year of investment (i.e., Leontief
technology) so they cannot adjust to the new relative input prices. A “vintage” parameter in the
model determines the fraction of old capital that is so frozen in its technical characteristics. The
degree of rigidity of old capital stock will influence the speed with which sectors can adjust their
production processes in response to changing input prices, and thus affect the cost of imposing
emissions controls (Jacoby and Sue Wing, 1999).
4. TECHNICAL CHANGE IN SECTOR-LEVEL PRODUCTION
As implied by the discussion above, it is difficult to compare measures of technical change
across different models. Apart from the differences in terminology—Leontief vs. aggregate
production function concepts—it is difficult to separate technology phenomena from other
structural change. For example, a common technology-related summary measure for an economy
is the GHG intensity of economic output. Regrettably, attempts to attribute an observed change
in intensity to different sources—such as technical change, shifts in patterns of consumption,
changes in the sectoral composition of output, or associated changes in relative prices—will
differ depending on the level of disaggregation of the economy and other structural
characteristics of the model applied to the question. What for a model with ten sectors would be
judged an exogenous improvement in energy efficiency might, for a model with 50 sectors, be
seen as an endogenous shift from iron and steel production to aluminum or plastics, along with
some price-induced substitution in each sector. In a bottom-up model of iron and steel industry,
meanwhile, energy saving might be traceable to a specific change in technique or perhaps greater
use of recycled steel. Therefore what is described as technical change at a sectoral level in a CGE
model is, to some degree, an artifact of the aggregation chosen and other aspects of model
structure. These distinctions can to some extent be explored using the EPPA model as an
example.
4.1 Exogenous Change
The main exogenous technological change factors incorporated in EPPA are improvements in
labor productivity growth (LPG), land productivity, and energy use productivity (AEEI). Also,
the model includes a set of a productivity factors describing the evolution of the emissions
coefficients for each non-CO2 greenhouse gas, similar to the AEEI for energy. Each of these is an
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input-enhancing factor.5 Labor productivity growth, coupled with projected population increase,
is a key factor determining economic growth in the model. The assumption in EPPA is that
improvements reflected in the AEEI parameter will be adopted in the reference case, so thus
there is no residual of less-than-zero cost abatement options that would accompany the
introduction of a GHG policy.6
In the Annex B countries, the energy efficiency of the electric sector is modeled as improving
at a rate of 0.40 to 0.45% per year while non-electric sectors increase in energy efficiency by
1.2 to 1.3% per year. The slower improvement in the electric sector assures that, over the 100-
year horizon of the model, the electric production efficiency does not exceed a thermodynamic
limit or engineering estimates of the maximum potential improvement. It is also necessary to
choose a low elasticity of substitution between fuel and capital and labor in the electric
production because this parameter allows further improvement in efficiency in response to rising
fuel prices, as perhaps augmented by a GHG emission penalty (For more discussion, see
McFarland et al., 2004).
The performance of aggregate energy intensity differs among developing countries, with
some improving and some not. The latter pattern probably reflects structural change toward more
energy intensive infrastructure development that is hidden in the EPPA aggregation. To capture
this phenomenon we create three groups of developing country regions based on per capita
income levels. The two lower income groups have a negative AEEI—energy intensity
grows—for several decades as they complete their structural adjustment and then it improves.
The wealthiest of these start with an AEEI of zero and then gradually improve. The assumption
is that, as per capita income rises to levels more like the developed countries; these regions will
experience AEEI rates closer to those that developed countries have achieved over the past
several decades.
4.2 Endogenous Change
From the viewpoint of some engineering process models, where a shift among Leontief-level
activities may be viewed as a change (e.g., recall the earlier gas vs. hybrid car example) all of the
substitutions in production as produced by a CGE model may be thought of as endogenous
changes in “technology.” Even applying the conventional microeconomic definition of
technology (as a set of production possibilities that might be accessed at different relative prices)
the EPPA model will show shifts in production process that are properly classified as including
some level of endogenous technical change. Four such areas of change can be identified.
                                                 
5
 The non-CO2 emissions productivity factors only enhance productivity when there is a positive GHG price (i.e., in
policy cases but not in the reference case). Emissions-reducing technology is obviously not cost-saving if there is
no cost associated with the emitting the gas.
6
 In contrast, bottom-up studies sometimes portray these enhancements as free (or better than free) responses to
emissions control measures.
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Factor Substitution In Response to Price and Income Change. Because the estimation of
key elasticities unavoidably involves some combination of substitution possibilities available
today and those that may be added in the future, changes in relative prices lead to shifts in
production (as reflected in the associated mix of inputs) that imply some new
technology—and thus endogenous change. This will occur, for example, in the substitution
between energy and non-energy inputs, in response to rising relative fuel prices or a GHG
emissions penalty.7 Substitution between other inputs can also affect single factor measures of
technology such as labor productivity or agricultural yields. Similar effects originate in the
household sector. The ability of households and other demand sectors to substitute among
goods allows consumers to shift away from GHG intensive goods to less GHG intensive ones,
in response to rising prices of energy or GHG control measures. The structure of consumption
within EPPA also shifts in response to rising income. Elasticities of substitution are positively
related to per capita income, and the share parameters for agriculture and vs. other goods are
negatively related to per capita income. As these forces lead production away from the
benchmark levels in the SAM, some of the movement represents endogenous changes in
technology.
Non-GHG Emissions Factor Improvement. Emission factors for the non-GHG gases fall as a
function of income, reflecting the observation that higher income countries have lower
emissions intensities. This change may, in part, reflect demand for environmental quality
through regulation that is not represented explicitly in EPPA. Even so, it reflects an
endogenous improvement in technology with respect to its pollution emissions.
Capital Accumulation and Vintaging. Capital accumulation (savings and investment in
excess of depreciation) tend to lower the cost of capital and thus to create substitution toward
capital and away from energy. To the degree some new options are reflected in the elasticities,
this involves technical change. Also, the vintaged structure of EPPA continuously updates the
technology structure of each sector. More broadly, the returns to capital include not only the
returns to the normal physical capital stock but also, unless knowledge stock is modeled
explicitly (as per Sue Wing, 2001, or Goulder and Schneider, 1999) reflect returns to
knowledge embodied in that stock. Thus substitution between capital and energy implicitly
includes a substitution between knowledge and energy, and augmentation of the capital stock
can also be considered, in part, an augmentation of knowledge.8
Modeling of Non-Extant Supply Options. Though presently not the case in EPPA, CGE
models may include non-extant supply technologies, assumed to become available only at
some time in the future, which represent endogenous change if an when they penetrate supply
markets (e.g., advanced nuclear power). Also, as described below, representations of these
options may include cost reduction with experience (learning by doing), which also introduces
a form of endogenous technical change.
Given these features of CGE models, great care should be taken in considering the
introduction of a new endogenous process of technical change, perhaps replacing a currently
exogenous process with an explicit endogenous one. The new process should not be casually
added on top of those already existing in the model, at the risk of double-counting.
                                                 
7
 In addition, simulations may assume a value of σEVA that increases over time, further increasing the range of possible
technological change.
8
 This interpretation does not deal with some particular features of knowledge generation such as the non-appropriable
spillovers of knowledge among sectors, and nations.
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4.3 The Relative Importance of Technology Parameters
As a result of ongoing work on uncertainty in the MIT Integrated Global System Model
(Webster et al., 2003), of which EPPA is a part, preliminary results are available on a set of tests
of the sensitivity of key EPPA results to its input parameters (Cossa, 2004). Based on modeler’s
judgment, informed by experience of previous experiments of this type, those parameters likely
to have the greatest influence on total emissions and control costs have been selected for
analysis. Then the model is simulated with each of these parameters varied, one by one, by plus
and minus one standard deviation (this range determined, again, by modeler’s judgment of the
uncertainty in each).9 One model result being considered in the analysis is the US welfare cost of
a “Kyoto forever” emissions policy, observed in 2010 and 2050. The results for 2010 are shown
in Figure 3.
The widths of the bars in this so-called tornado diagram indicate the relative influence of the
top ten among the variables studied, considered independently. Technology-related variables
take on substantial importance. The ease of substitution between energy and value added, SIG-
EVA (σEVA in Figure 2), turns out to be the most important, reflecting as it does the relative
flexibility of the production structure in response to policy shock. For near term adjustment, the
vintaging parameter (which determines how much of inherited capital cannot be adapted in its
input structure) is also important. Next are three variables that influence the degree of emissions
0.00% 0.05% 0.10% 0.15% 0.20% 0.25% 0.30% 0.35% 0.40% 0.45%
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Figure 3. Tornado Diagram: 2010 Welfare Cost of Kyoto Restriction.
                                                 
9
 The approach here approximates the relative importance of these different factors, but not too much should be
made of the exact ranking. It depends on the range used (our estimate of the standard deviation) and, less
obviously perhaps, it also depends on the reference values chosen for all of the other variables, the country shown,
and the policy imposed. A more careful elicitation of the uncertainty distribution for each parameter, a full Monte
Carlo analysis, and then statistical attribution of uncertainty to each parameter would be a more rigorous
approach, perhaps revealing non-linear interactions.
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reduction that must be achieved in 2010: LPG and population growth (POP) determining the
economic growth over the period, and AEEI showing the degree to which the task is alleviated
by autonomous forces. Parameters influencing the emissions of methane in agriculture and
industry take positions six and eight, but again key elasticities are ranked seventh and ninth.
(For the cost results in 2050, the vintaging drops far down the ranking and the various elasticities
rise in importance.)
Finally, the tenth factor in relative influence on 2010 welfare cost is a “mark-up” factor
related to the costs of non-extant technologies (described in greater detail below). This
experiment was not designed to fully explore uncertainty in the non-extant technologies, but the
results are informative nonetheless. It is not surprising that the costs of these new technologies
have a small influence on a time horizon as short as 2010. But even in the results for 2050 (when
the GHG constraint is much tighter) this measure of uncertainty about these costs is dominated
by the variables (except for vintaging) that take the top ranks in 2010. These results reinforce the
view that variables related to aggregate technology structure are high priority targets for research
and, as suggested below, uncertainty analysis.
5. MODELING NON-EXTANT SUPPLY OPTIONS
The non-extant supply sources, listed in Table 2, are all implemented as production functions,
with various outputs modeled as substitutes for energy products from the aggregate sectors. All
produce perfect substitutes—for oil, gas or electricity as appropriate—except for the intermittent
sources, wind and solar power. All require inputs of labor, capital, intermediate goods, and an
appropriate resource factor. They differ from one another in detail, but in general the factor
proportions are set so as to impose a mark-up above current substitutes, the magnitude of this
premium determined from current engineering studies. In some cases a resource factor is used to
represent adjustment costs that affect the rate at which a technology takes market share once it
enters. Changes in input prices, and output prices of competing sources, determine when
introduction will occur. Thus to some degree their use is subject to prices changes. In particular,
capital deepening, as a result of a falling relative cost of capital, aids the capital-intensive sources
such as wind and solar electricity.
Several issues arise in modeling these non-extant technologies, and two are elaborated here:
the quality of product, and influences on market penetration including adjustment costs and
potential effects of learning by doing. These topics represent an important area of research in the
modeling of technical change and its influence in climate policy.
5.1 Quality of Product
Most studies of the cost of wind and solar power, and their potential reduction with cumulative
experience, express the results in terms of cost per kWh. This result, then, is frequently compared
with the busbar cost of fossil electric energy in order to prepare estimates of its relative
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competitive position, or to conduct benefit-cost studies of programs to “buy down” the cost by
government subsidies (International Energy Agency, 2000). A difficulty with these studies is that,
their supply being intermittent, these sources do not produce a perfect substitute for fossil or
nuclear generated electricity. Take wind power as an example. The value of a kWh from a coal
plant includes a component representing the high availability of the plant capacity. Wind, on the
other hand, is perhaps not best thought of as providing a substitute for fossil generation but as
contributing negative stochastic load. In a centrally-planned electric system, wind turbines would
not receive a capacity credit equivalent to a fossil generating plant. In a deregulated system, where
dependable plant capacity is rewarded in day-ahead or other futures markets, wind may get little
or not credit—its main return coming in the market for spot generation.
However its output is formulated, an issue arises as to how to incorporate such an intermittent
source in a CGE model. Two approaches now under study are shown in Figure 4. Note that
electricity from wind is modeled by a nesting of CES functions, involving inputs of labor, capital,
equipment from the OTHR sector, and a resource factor representing limitations in the wind
resource itself. The markup for wind at this level could be adjusted over time, say in response to
cumulative output, but at present it is held constant awaiting improvement on the larger question,
which is how to integrate this technology into the modeled electric power system. Currently the
method in Figure 4a is implemented in the EPPA model. Aggregated-sector supplies of fossil,
nuclear and hydroelectric power are treated as perfect substitutes (ρ = ∞), as are supplies from
NGCC technology without capture and storage, and NGCC and IGCC technologies with capture
and storage. Wind supply, however, is modeled as producing an imperfect substitute (ρ < 0).10 An
alternative formulation is shown in Figure 4b. In this method, a kWh of power from a wind source
is treated as a perfect substitute for fossil and other sources (ρ = 0), but then a unit of the wind
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Fig. 4. Alternative Formulations of Wind Power: (a) Imperfect Substitution; (b) Partial Capacity Credit.
                                                 
10
 A CES function controls the substitution at the top of the nest in Figure 4a and, because this functional form tends
to be share preserving, this approach will not allow large-scale expansion of wind without recalibration over time.
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production must include, in fixed proportions, a unit of standby capacity or energy storage (e.g.,
pumped hydro, compressed air)—so that it is a true substitute as viewed by the system planner or
as valued in a deregulated generation market.
The relative role of wind power, naturally, is very sensitive to the value chosen for ρ or the
standby requirement and, because these features are poorly understood, these quantities tend to
function as tuning parameters in model simulations. Further research on the capacity value of
wind resources is needed to improve its representation in CGE-type models (an no doubt in other
types of models as well). The same holds, of course, for solar power.
5.2 Adjustment Costs and Experience
Even given an estimate of the bottom-up costs of a non-extant technology, and any
corrections for differences in quality, issues remain in the modeling within a CGE context. Two
are of greatest importance. First, even if the costs of the technology itself are unchanging with
time and experience, the pace at which a new technology, once cost competitive, can take market
share is dependent on a number of factors that may be loosely classified as adjustment cost. And
second, whatever the pace of expansion might be at constant technology cost, the possibility
exists of cost reduction though cumulative experience—a process perhaps enhanced by R&D
expenditure and scale economies, but which is conventionally summarized as “learning by
doing.” These two influences overlap, calling for extra care in model formulation and selection
of parameters. We can look at each of these in turn, using as an example integrated coal
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) generation with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).
Adjustment Costs and Penetration Rates. Once the output of such a new technical option
becomes cheaper than alternative sources, an unrestrained mathematical model may show it
taking market share at a very rapid rate. In practice, however, a number of factors influence the
pace at which a new technology can expand. The prices of specialized resources—such as
knowledgeable engineering and specialized manufacturing and services—can be driven up if
expansion is too rapid. Also, interpreting the term somewhat broadly, “specialized resources”
can be taken to include requirements such as environmental and other regulatory approvals, and
the observational, analytical and legal work needed to attain them. Also, non-competitive
features of market structure can cause delays in development and expansion.
Integrated assessment models apply different methods to impose these elements of
institutional and physical reality. The approach taken in the EPPA model is to include an input
factor that represents these influences. The approach can be demonstrated using Figure 5
(for now ignoring the dotted-line segments). To provide the needed carbon accounting, electric
provision with CCS is modeled as comprised of a process of generation and transmission
coupled with a system of fuel supply and carbon sequestration. In the EPPA model, electric
output is measured and valued at the point of transfer to industries, consumers, and government.
Thus one component includes the cost of the IGCC generation plant (Gen) and the cost of
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Figure 5. NGCC and IGCC with Carbon Capture and Sequestration.
transmission (Trans). CCS technologies do not avoid carbon emissions altogether. For
incorporation in EPPA carbon accounting, therefore, the fuel and sequestration (Fuel and Seq)
component divides the fuel input into two portions: one whose CO2 is sequestered and the other
whose carbon is released. For example, in an IGCC facility with capture, the split is 90%
“ex. CO2” and 10% “& CO2” in the figure. Then a combination of capital and labor is required
for the CO2 disposal. The various factor shares in the nesting (the a’s illustrated in Eq. 1) are
calibrated so that the cost of supply from this technology is some mark-up above that from the
aggregated sector for which it provides a substitute product. For IGCC/CCS this base-year mark-
up, if constructed today, is set at 1.5 times the cost of pulverized coal generation without CCS.11
With just the part of the nesting described until now, there is little restraint to the calculated
expansion once the carbon price becomes high enough to make the IGCC/CCS economically
competitive. Note, however, that the model includes an additional input, Res, which is a required
input to supply from this source. This variable represents specialized inputs, required to support
expansion.12 The pace of expansion in any period is not fixed, but the faster it proceeds the
higher the costs of these specialized resources, which serves to restrain the pace of growth.
The magnitude of this factor increases period to period in relation to the growth in cumulative
output (representing a combined process of industry expansion and accumulation of regulatory
experience) and the level of price pressure. The expansion of the Res factor is calibrated to
mimic the experience of such introduction elsewhere, with the early decades of nuclear power
providing the clearest precedent.
                                                 
11
 The mark-ups used in this example draw on unpublished work by McFarland and Herzog. Recall that the
valuation is at the point of consumption, so the comparison includes the influence of transmission cost, assumed
to be the same for the two options. The implied difference in busbar cost is greater than a factor of 1.5.
12
 For discussion of other factors influencing the pace of expansion, not explicit in the model, see McFarland and
Herzog (2003).
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The result of this procedure is shown in Figure 6, which presents a series of simulations of
the expansion of IGCC/CCS in the US under a hypothesized imposition of a “Kyoto forever”
emissions constraint.13 An example is the expansion of this technology if the cost of
implementation in 2000 were to continue throughout the period. Under this assumption about
the cost of the plant itself, IGCC/CCS would not be economic until 2045. From that point
forward, the rate at which it takes market share is limited by the gradually growing quantity of
the specialized resource, Res. With variation in the calibration of the Res process, time of first
penetration would not change, but its rate of growth would vary. This process likely will be
different for different technologies and national circumstances.
Learning by Doing and Cost Reduction. Frequently, technologies that are non-extant today
are anticipated to be economic in the future not only because the price of the energy form for
which they substitute will rise over time (perhaps because of a GHG penalty) but because their
costs will fall. The reduction may be modeled to be the result of R&D expenditure and scale
economies, but in some cases it is expected that the improvement could result from growing
experience with the technology. Conventionally, this process is treated as a separate matter from
the issue of specialized resources and adjustment cost raised above, although there is evident
overlap in the concepts and their interrelation is a useful topic for future research.
Here we summarize the current status of ongoing work on the implementation in EPPA of a
model of possible reduction in technology cost driven by cumulative experience, which has been
formulated to allow experimentation with this process.14 Again we use the non-extant technology
                                                 
13
 The calculations shown here were performed using EPPA Version 3, as CCS has not yet been implemented in
Version 4 described above. In subsequent drafts of the paper EPPA results will be substituted. The points made
here will not be influenced by the change.
14
 A recursive dynamic (i.e., myopic) model like EPPA faces limitations in analyzing learning phenomena. To the
extent that potential investors in a technology subject to learning do look ahead (and if they can capture the future
rents created by cost reduction from learning) the pace of market penetration will tend to be underestimated. For
analysis using a forward-looking model, see Manne and Richels (2002).
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IGCC/CCS as an example. In any model of learning, there are two key parameters: the learning
rate, and (since the process conventionally is formulated as a logarithmic process) the asymptote
or minimum unit cost toward which experience will drive the technology. Bottom-up analysis of
this technology has suggested that (ignoring the benefit of avoided carbon charges) it will never
be as cheap a generating source as pulverized coal generation, and that the best that can be
expected after exhaustion of all the learning benefits is a markup of 1.08 over the current cost of
coal-fired power without capture. Again the premium is measured at the point of transfer to
consumer sectors in the model.
If IGCC/CCS were available now, or in the next decade or so, at that long-run cost, then the
technology would take market share more rapidly than in the case above where its cost never fell
below a mark-up of 1.5 over pulverized coal. That result is shown in Figure 6 as the penetration
of the technology under conditions of “Long-Run Cost”. In some studies of this technology, its
possible contribution has been computed using the estimated asymptote of the cost, but assuming
that it will not be available at this reduced cost until some specified time in the future (e.g.,
(McFarland et al., 2004). Using this procedure, any role of cumulative experience in lowering
cost is at best implicit in the time lag assumed before the technology is available at the assumed
(lowest) cost.
A method that will allow study of this process is illustrated in Figure 5, where now the
dotted-line component of the figure comes into play. Now the left side of the nesting, expressed
in solid lines yields a cost that reflects the long-run asymptote in a model of learning. In this
example the markup is 1.08, as noted above. However, as indicated by the dotted line portion,
output from this technology also requires an additional expense, which we may call an
“inexperience penalty.” Before the technology is introduced, this penalty is 0.42 in this example,
summing to a markup of 1.5. The CO2 penalty (corrected for changes in factor prices) must raise
the competition above the resulting cost for this technology to see initial introduction.
It is assumed in the example that, without subsidy as discussed below, this cost penalty does
not fall in the absence of actual production experience.15 However, as experience is gathered
through cumulative generation, the penalty falls, ultimately approaching zero. The implied
learning rate is a subject for study, but in this example it is 15% per doubling. The result in terms
of market penetration is shown in Figure 6 as “Current Cost + Learning.” The technology enters
at the same time as in the no-learning or “current cost” case but grows more rapidly in output.
The production profile reflects the effects of modeled learning and also general equilibrium
effects on the carbon price itself.16
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 Such a formulation could be combined with either an autonomous reduction or one modeled as a function of R&D
expenditure in the absence of production experience.
16
 This formulation may also provide a basis for study of proposals to “buy down” the cost of a non-extant
technology through subsidy of the early periods of learning. This might be done by comparing the cost difference,
year by year, of forcing from “current cost” penetration to some more rapid path.
22
6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH TARGETS
Given the scope and complexity of the climate issue, a number of different forms of models of
economic growth, technology development and emissions are going to be required. The CGE
type of model, like EPPA and its several cousins in the US and elsewhere, has many advantages.
Particularly important are its facility for analysis of the way energy use and other GHG emitting
activities are interwoven in the economy, its ability to study mitigation policies that are applied
at the national and sectoral level, and how these measures reverberate through international
trade, and its framework for consistent accounting of quantities, prices and welfare effects.
Naturally, these many advantages come at a price, the main sacrifice in the climate context
being in the ability to represent energy sources of interest, or particular visions of technical
change, in great detail. For many applications of integrated assessment this shortcoming is not
serious, but for studies focused on particular technological options, narrowly defined—like wind
power, a carbon sequestration scheme, or a clean Diesel car—model limitations become more
troublesome. Nonetheless, there is need to include the most important of these specific, sub-
sector-level options, like the non-extant technologies described above. And this combination of
functions leads the two general realms of research in understanding and modeling technology
and technical change that we have laid out above. One is the analysis of technology at the level
of sectoral aggregation of the model, and the other is the representation of technology of what we
have termed “non-extant” sources, and their evolution.
With regard to analysis at the sector level, we have argued (and demonstrated with a simple
sensitivity analysis) that parameters that define the technology characteristics of the
model—such as labor productivity growth (LPG), AEEI, vintaging parameters and key
elasticities—are important to the results that are obtained for policy assessments. Unfortunately,
all these variables reflect technical processes about which there is substantial uncertainty. The
residuals such as productivity growth and AEEI have been a subject of theoretical and empirical
work for over a half-century, yet remain poorly understood. In this circumstance there is no
substitute for analysis that explores uncertainty in these parameters. This requirement then points
to further work on the use of expert elicitation in studying parameter distributions, and the
development of historical data as input to this process (e.g., Webster et al., 2003). The same need
arises for the key elasticities.
Study of uncertainty in key elasticities also applies to the modeling and analysis of the non-
extant technologies, but for these a number of other issues deserve attention as well. Two are
highlighted above. The best way to formulate analysis of technologies that produce a different
quality of product—like the intermittency of wind and solar power—is still an open question.
The second of the two approaches summarized above (Figure 4b) seems the more attractive, but
application of this idea requires additional side analysis of the stochastic behavior of wind
resources and their integration into power systems along with competing sources that have other
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stochastic characteristics. A similar analysis probably applies to solar power—not the seasonal
solar input but the intervening effects of weather.
Related to the issue of product quality, but not covered here is the proper characterization of
the way a particular non-extant electric source, with its particular output cost, will be fitted into
the load dispatch of a power system. Calculation of the technology cost as input into an EPPA-
type model depends on a question that is beneath the level of aggregation of the model, which is
whether the new plant is likely to be dispatched on base load, in intermediate load, or as a
peaking unit (i.e., its capacity factor). McFarland and Herzog (2003) describe an approach used
for CCS in the EPPA model, which involves making an assumption about the result of load
dispatch. Sands (2004) explores an alternative approach (still in a CGE context) which involves
splitting the electricity nesting to distinguish peaking from base load service, so that the model
itself can make a crude version of the capacity factor choice.
These challenges of modeling the non-extant technologies result from the fact that the
essentially top-down structure of a CGE structure is being stretched to mimic the behavior of
bottom-up analyses. At some point, it surely becomes preferable to attain the joint advantages of
these two approaches with a looser coupling of the technology detail of engineering process
models to the general equilibrium representation of the economy (e.g., Schafer and Jacoby,
2004)—a choice that is yet another issue for continuing research.
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